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Confounded by Cromartie: Are Racial
Stereotypes Now Acceptable Across the
Board or Only When Used in Support
of Partisan Gerrymanders?
JOHN HART ELY*
In Easley v. Cromartie,' decided April 18, 2001, the Supreme
Court, Justice Breyer speaking for a majority of five, upheld North Car-
olina's long-litigated Twelfth Congressional District against a charge of
racial gerrymander. This was the Twelfth District's fourth appearance
before the Court (quite considerately for those who would write about it,
each time under a different name). In Shaw v. Reno, decided in 1993,2
the Court reversed and remanded the ruling of the three-judge district
court below that appellants had failed to state a claim of unconstitutional
pro-minority gerrymander. On remand, the three-judge court rejected
the claim on the merits, and in 1996, in Shaw v. Hunt,3 the Court
reversed outright, invalidating District 12. In 1997 the state redrew the
district's boundaries, rendering it somewhat less bizarre, though still
intentionally including an unusually high percentage of African-Ameri-
* Richard A. Hausler Professor of Law, University of Miami. With no more irony than is
compelled by the situation, I dedicate this Comment to Mel Watt, whose congressional district
was upheld in Easley v. Cromnartie. Mel took a couple of courses from me my second year in
teaching and was, even then, a conspicuously honorable and intelligent person. Given the
opportunity I would vote for him without a moment's hesitation. I'd add my confident
speculation that he would be elected in an ungerrymandered election, had he not proved that in
1998.
1. 121 S.Ct. 1452 (2001). The case was Hunt v. Cromnartie at the time of its argument and
decision, but has since been retitled, Easley having recently replaced Hunt as governor.
2. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
3. 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
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can voters. In April 1998, apparently getting with the program, the
three-judge court granted summary judgment invalidating the 1997 ver-
sion of the District. This time the state legislature responded in better
faith, drawing a considerably less irregular version of District 12,4 which
was only 35 percent African-American, in time for the 1998 election,
which was won by African-American incumbent Mel Watt. This proved
too perfect a fairy-tale ending for the Supreme Court, however, which in
Hunt v. Cromartie (1999) 5 reversed the three-judge court's 1998 deci-
sion, holding that there was a triable issue of fact whether the 1997 ger-
rymander was engineered for racial or, rather, political reasons, and that
summary judgment had therefore been inappropriate. The 1998 remap
no longer seen as necessary, the 1997 version was reinstated for the next
election.6 After a hearing, the three-judge court invalidated the resur-
rected 1997 District on the merits. Then in 2001, in Easley v. Cromar-
tie, the Supreme Court reversed the three-judge court for the fourth
straight time, holding that it had committed "clear error" in concluding
that the gerrymander's "predominant purpose" had been racial (that is,
to create a strongly African-American district) rather than political (to
create a safely Democratic district). It turned out, or so at least it must
have seemed to the judges below, that the Supreme Court's theme was
not "invalidate the Twelfth District" but rather "reverse the three-judge
court": some days a guy must wonder why he didn't stay in practice.
In section I of this Comment I shall argue that the Supreme Court's
conclusion that the three-judge court committed clear error in finding
race to have been the predominant purpose of the gerrymander of Dis-
trict 12 was, if not itself "clear error" in the sense of being instantly
obvious fallacy, demonstrable error nonetheless. Were this the most
important problem with the Court's opinion, however, I would not have
authored this comment.' The opinion has more dangerous features,
though, and they are those suggested by my title, its essentially offhand
approval - both integral parts of its line of reasoning - of partisan
gerrymanders and racial stereotypes.
4. No longer reaching east to Greensboro and Durham or west to Gastonia, the [1998]
district was only 85 (rather than 160) miles between extreme points. It was also
noticeably wider, the result of closer conformity to county boundaries. And rather
than encompassing minor parts of ten counties, District 12 now consisted of one
complete county and parts of four others.
MARK MONMONIER, BUSHMANDERS & BULLWINKLES: How POLITICIANS MANIPULATE ELECTRON-
IC MAPS AND CENSUS DATA TO WIN ELECTIONS 52 (2001).
5. 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
6. Maps of the 1997 and 1998 versions of District 12 appear on page .
7. See text at notes 58-59 infra - though I grant you 2001: A Race Travesty is a tempting
490 . [Vol. 56:489
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I. OF ERROR CLEAR AND PURPOSE PREDOMINANT
With the exception of the short-lived 1998 map, District 12's his-
tory has obviously been one of attempting - largely as a means of
insuring (federal) Justice Department pre-clearance 8 - to include as
high a percentage of African-Americans as possible. As noted, and for
obvious reasons, the current (1997) version is less flagrant than the 1992
version that the Supreme Court invalidated in 1996, coming in at
46.67% black (as opposed to 22% in the entire state). True, 46.67% is
less than half, though not by much, and neither of those facts is coinci-
dental. The legislative history makes clear what would have been obvi-
ous anyway, that the state districters were trying to walk a fine line
between the Justice Department's demand for a district where an Afri-
can-American would have a good chance of winning and the threat of
another Supreme Court invalidation, from which at least some of the
districters felt they could immunize themselves if they stayed under
50%. 9 Obviously this makes no sense in theory: 1° an intention to
include as many blacks as possible is, well, an intention to include as
many blacks as possible, or as the three-judge court put it, "using a com-
puter to achieve a district that is just under 50% minority is not less a
predominant use of race than using it to achieve a district that is just
over 50% minority."' "I
District 12 is depicted in the top map on page -. While it is not
as bizarre as its predecessor - faint praise, to put it mildly - it is
"barely contiguous in parts"' 2 and remains by a considerable margin the
most geographically contorted district in the state 3 in terms of both of
the now-standard Pildes-Niemi indicators,' 4 dispersion compactness and
perimeter compactness.'
5
8. The Department has construed section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(1994), to require such preclearance. See John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders: The Good, the Bad, and
the Ugly, 50 STAN. L. REV. 607, 612 (1998).
9. Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 407, 420 (E.D. Va. 2000).
10. Happily, it was not the stated theory of Justice Breyer's Opinion of the Court, though his
gratuitous observation that if you're looking for an unconstitutional district you probably should
focus on District 1, the barely majority-minority district upheld below (it was considerably more
compact), see text at note 28 infra, does raise the spectre that 50% may become the working
constitutional standard. I'll grant that it's administrable, and that's good, but it isn't enough.
1I. 133 F. Supp. 2d at 420.
12. Id. at 414.
13. 121 S.Ct. at 1459.
14. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV.
483 (1993). See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959-60 (1996); MONMONIER, supra note 4, at 65.
15. To calculate dispersion compactness a circle is circumscribed around the district. The
reported coefficient is the proportion of the area of the circumscribed circle that is also included
within the district. District 12's dispersion coefficient is 0.109 on scale of 0 to 1, the average for
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In Shaw I the Supreme Court described the 1992 plan's District
12 as "unusually shaped . . . approximately 160 miles long and, for
much of its length, no wider than the [Interstate]-85 corridor. It
winds in snake-like fashion through tobacco country, financial cen-
ters, and manufacturing areas until it gobbles in enough enclaves of
black neighborhoods." . . . The 1997 Plan's District 12 is similar: it
is "unusually shaped," it is "snake-like," and "gobbles in" African-
American population centers. The evidence establishes that although
its length has been shortened by approximately 65 miles, it still winds
from Charlotte to Greensboro along the Interstate-85 corridor, detour-
ing to envelop heavily African-American portions of cities such as
Statesville, Salisbury, and Winston-Salem. It also connects commu-
nities not joined in a congressional district, other than the unconstitu-
tional 1992 Plan, since the whole of Western North Carolina was one
district, nearly two hundred years ago.' 6
Political subdivisions were routinely dissected, nay scrimshawed,
so as to gather their black neighborhoods into District 12.
72.9 percent of the total population of Forsyth County allocated
to District 12 is African-American, while only 11.1 percent of its
total population assigned to neighboring District 5 is African-Ameri-
can. . . . Similarly, Mecklenburg County is split so 51.9 of its total
population allocated to District 12 is African American, while only
7.2 percent of the total population assigned to adjoining District 9 is
African American .... [T]he four largest cities assigned [in part] to
District 12 are split along racial lines. . . . For example, where the
City of Charlotte is split between District 12 and adjacent District 9,
59.47 percent of the population assigned to District 12 is African-
American, while only 8.12 percent of the Charlotte population
assigned to District 9 is African-American .... And where the city of
Greensboro is split, 55.58 percent of the population assigned to Dis-
trict 12 is African-American, while only 10.70 percent of the popula-
tion assigned to District 6 is African-American. 17
Enough to challenge a Houdini, it would appear: whatever can Jus-
tice Breyer do to escape? Two things, apparently - one so flimsy that
we probably should assume that he didn't really mean it, the other
enough to make this a close call under a preponderance of the evidence
the state being 0.354, the next lowest 0.206. The perimeter compactness coefficient is the
proportion of the area in the district relative to that of a circle with the same perimeter. District
12's perimeter compactness coefficient is 0.041, the state's average 0.192 and next lowest 0.107.
Intrastate comparisons do not begin to tell the story, however, as North Carolina's districting
scheme is relatively contorted statewide: in terms of both coefficients District 12 ranks among the
least compact in the country. See 133 F. Supp. 2d at 413-15; cf. MONMONIER, supra note 4, at 65-
68 (focusing on predecessor district).
16. 133 F. Supp. 2d at 418-19.
17. Id. at 413. There's more, mainly id. at 415, but I'm not a complete sadist.
[Vol. 56:489
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standard. The first is that the facts I have related so far respecting "the
district's shape, its splitting of towns and counties, and its high African-
American voting population [are things] we previously found insuffi-
cient to support summary judgment."' 8 Now I've known Steve Breyer a
long time - we clerked the same Term and were on the same faculty
for ten years - and can certainly testify to what you presumably already
know, that he is as intelligent (indeed, all-round good) a justice as we've
seen in a long time. It would therefore perhaps be best to construe this
observation as simply pointless,' 9 for as an argument it is a flaming non
sequitur: the fact that factors A, B and C were found insufficient to
justify finessing the trial does not mean they thereby lost their probative
value, which in this case is massive.
Breyer's weightier point is that as contorted as the shape may be, it
is essentially as consistent with an intent to create a safe Democratic
district as it is with an intent to create a district that is heavily African-
American: "political affiliation explains splitting cities and counties as
well as does race".2 ° Obviously this possibility had occurred to the court
below, which rejected it:
As the uncontroverted evidence demonstrates, however, the legisla-
tors excluded many heavily-Democratic precincts from District 12,
even when those precincts immediately border the Twelfth and would
have established a far more compact district. The only clear thread
woven throughout the districting process is that the border of the
Twelfth district meanders to include nearly all of the precincts with
African-American populations of over forty percent which lie
between Charlotte and Greensboro, inclusive ..... [W]ithout fail,
Democratic districts adjacent to District 12 yielded their minority
areas to that district, retaining white Democratic districts. 21
Justice Houdini again to the rescue: the primary evidence upon which
the District Court relied here was "evidence of voter. registration, not
18. 121 S.Ct. at 1459.
19. At one point he seems to leave open the possibility that these factors are still relevant, id.
at 1456, but at yet another point suggests (again) that because they weren't enough before, they
have somehow dropped out of the equation:
The [lower] court based its . . . conclusion in part upon the district's snakelike
shape, the way in which it split cities and towns, and its heavily African-American
(47%) voting population . . . - all matters this Court had considered when it found
summary judgment inappropriate ....
Id. at 1457. Nor am I the only one to suppose that the Court's opinion can be read this way:
Justice Thomas's four-justice dissent countered that "[a]though this evidence was appropriate
when we held that summary judgment was inappropriate [Thomas had written the Court's earlier
opinion], we certainly did not hold that it was irrelevant in determining whether racial
gerrymandering occurred." Id. at 1473.
20. Id. at 1463.
21. 133 F. Supp. 2d at 419. This discussion too goes on at some further length. Id.; see also
id. at 414.
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voting behavior."2 Since, however, everyone know that blacks are reli-
able Democratic voters, a focus on voting behavior would naturally be
expected to yield a high number of black neighborhoods.23
However, numerical correlation is not all the lower court relied on.
Senator Cooper admitted that he had been unsure whether he could get
the plan pre-cleared by the Justice Department without creating a major-
ity-minority district.14
Senator Cooper's testimony also brought to light a February 10,
1997 email message ...sent to him by Director of Bill Drafting
Gerry Cohen .... stat[ing] that "By shifting areas in Beaufort, Pitt,
Craven and Jones Counties, I was able to boost the minority percent-
age in the first district from 48.1% to 49.25%. The district was only
plurality white, as the white percentage was 49.67%." . . . The email
continues, "This was all the district could be improved by switching
between the 1st and 3rd unless I went into Pasquotank, Perquimans,
or Camden. I was able to make the district plurality black by switch-
ing between the I st and 4th . . ." The Cohen-Cooper email also states
that "I have moved the Greensboro Black community into the 12th
and now need to take bout [sic] 60,000 out of the 12th."25
Senator Cooper was also questioned about a statement he had made on
March 25, 1997, to the (federal) House of Representatives' congres-
sional redistricting committee, to the effect that the 1997 plan "provides
for a fair geographical, racial, and partisan balance throughout the state
of North Carolina." He testified that although "partisan balance" had
indeed referred to maintaining the six-six Democrat/Republican balance
in North Carolina's congressional delegation, "racial balance" had not
been intended to refer to maintaining the ten-two white/black balance 26
(although, of course, that is what it did). The trial court understandably
dismissed this testimony as "simply not credible".27
In response Justice Breyer notes that the e-mail discusses both Dis-
trict I and District 12, and adds that if anything "it suggests that the
legislature appears to have paid less attention to race in respect to the
12th District than in respect to the 1st District .... -1 However, this
wasn't a contest for Worst in Show, and as Justice Thomas noted in
22. 121 S.Ct. at 1459.
23. The Court cited defendants' expert for the proposition that "registration data were the
least reliable information upon which to predict voter behavior". 121 S.Ct. at 1460. Less reliable,
we can thus assume, than, say, hat size? Surprising.
24. 133 F. Supp. 2d at 411. District I did end up majority-minority (and was upheld below);
District 12, of course, fell just short.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 412.
27. Id. at 419.
28. 121 S.Ct. at 1464.
[Vol. 56:489
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dissent, "a decision can be racially motivated even if another decision
was also racially motivated."29 In fact Breyer's point is even weaker
than that: the two districts were drawn and enacted by precisely the
same cast of characters, and as the Court noted in 1973, in Keyes v.
School District No. 1,30 the fact that they were racially motivated as to
one district makes it more likely that they were racially motivated 3' as to
the other. Beyond that, what Breyer doesn't note is that (in the same
opinion) the three-judge court upheld the First District, despite the fact
that it was majority-minority, suggesting that that court was other than
hell-bent on finding racial gerrymandering on the part of the North Car-
olina legislature, and capable of recognizing distinctions.32
Breyer also argues that though the e-mail may show that the plan's
architects made choices based on race, it "does not discuss the point of
the reference. It does not discuss why Greensboro's African-American
voters were placed in the 12th District ....- 3 They might, once again,
have been placed there on the theory that blacks are reliable Democratic
voters. Of this more later, but one might initially wonder why, if that
indeed had been the point of the selections in question, they were
described by those who made them in racial terms. (Given the.Court's
ordering of the constitutional priorities 34 it is difficult to imagine what
could have been thought the gain in dressing political motives in the
language of race.)
Justice Breyer states that "[t]he basic question is whether the legis-
lature drew District 12's boundaries because of race rather than because
29. Id. at 1475.
30. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
31. With respect to Cromartie, "racially motivated" obviously means "motivated by a desire
to facilitate the election of a black congressman," which seems morally different from an attempt
to preclude any such possibility and, at least when a majority of those responsible for the shape of
the district are white, arguably different constitutionally as well. Ely, supra note 8, at 629-32.
Nobody suggests antiminority animus was operative here, though the overall increase in
Republican districts typically effected by the creation of a heavily black district, see note 43 infra,
is likely to have some negative policy repercussions for poor people generally and consequently
many blacks, a realization to which a number of black opinion leaders reportedly are awakening,
which may attenuate the drive for majority-minority districts, Color Lines, NEW REPUBLIC, June
23, 2001, at 10-1l, though there are also reasons for doubting that it will. Ely, supra note 8, at
618-19 n. 253.
32. See 133 F. Supp. 2d at 415-16, 421-23. Unsurprisingly, there are facts cutting both ways
about both districts, to the point where at least in my opinion none of the four possible
combinations (both constitutional, both unconstitutional, only First unconstitutional, only Twelfth
unconstitutional) would have constituted "clear error". What Breyer hoped to gain by suggesting
that the First may have been unconstitutional is not evident: surely the suggestion lends no
support to his apparent inference that the Twelfth is constitutional.
33. 121 S.Ct. at 1464 (emphasis added).
34. But see text at note 76 infra.
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of political behavior". 5 The emphasis is in the original, but the dichot-
omy is false: the fact that politics undoubtedly numbered among the
motivations doesn't mean that race didn't as well. And clearly they both
did. The Court's response to this presumably would be that although it
is true that race and politics can both influence a decision, there can be
only one "predominant purpose," and that is, or at least it ought to be,
the constitutional standard. There are several problems with this. First,
the logic that makes motivation constitutionally relevant implies that
where constitutional and unconstitutional motives are both involved,36
the resulting decision should be invalidated unless it can be said with
some degree of confidence (as it plainly cannot here) that absent the
unconstitutional motive the selfsame action would have been taken
nonetheless.37 "Predominant purpose," at least as the Court employs the
term, is obviously a far cry from such a "but for" test.
Beyond that, the entire concept is indeterminate to the point of
incoherence.38 Is my predominant purpose as I sit here "processing
words" to straighten out the Supreme Court (fat chance), to show how
smart I am, to justify my salary, to fill the hours I spend above the
surface of the water, to help enhance the standing of Miami Law School,
to give my life some semblance of structure, to prove to at least one of
us that despite the fact that I recently moved to Florida I am still func-
tional? Even I don't know: all of these factors play a role. Moreover,
unlike the North Carolina legislature, I am but one person: 39 attempting
to determine the "predominant purpose" of the North Carolina legisla-
ture (as it attempts to gain federal preclearance) 40 compounds the
impossibility.
35. 121 S.Ct. at 1466.
36. I don't believe partisan motives are any more constitutional than (at least affirmative
action) racial motives, see text at note 76 infra, but for the moment we are assuming arguendo that
they are.
37. See generally Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. RFv. 95 (1971); John Hart Ely, Legislative
and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 78 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). In the past, the
Court has understood and explicated this clearly. E.g., Mount Healthy City School District Board
of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66, 270-71 n.21 (1977).
38. E.g., id. at 265; McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1973):
The search for legislative purpose is often elusive enough ... without a requirement
that primacy be ascertained. Legislation is frequently multipurposed: the removal
of even a "subordinate" purpose may shift altogether the consensus of legislative
judgment supporting the statute.
See generally Ely, supra note 8, at 611-14.
39. Another one-person one-decision example appears id. at 611-12, (If you were l6oking for
authority for the proposition in the text I'm afraid I have to disappoint you).
40. That racial considerations are paramount, and partisan considerations irrelevant, to federal
preclearance is another strong reason to question the Court's finding of clear error in Cromartie.
[Vol. 56:489
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Perhaps at this point Justice Breyer would respond that that's all
well and good, but when a decision to include an African-American
neighborhood is made - as it is theoretically possible that this one was
- on the theory that most blacks vote Democratic, politics is the "pre-
dominant purpose." Whatever other constitutional problems this line of
analysis may have,4' several observations are now in order. First:
Drawing a voting district involves an infinity of choices, each of
which is similarly likely to be influenced by a number of considera-
tions. The boundaries zig and zag, shuck and jive, sidle like side-
winders. And each spasm has at least one story of its own: How in
the name of heaven could one suppose the whole monstrosity to have
a "dominant purpose," unless it's to accommodates as many little
purposes as possible?4"
Second, even if it were appropriate to focus on one or another of the
micro-decisions that make up the shaping of a district it seems impossi-
ble to say that an overtly racial choice was "actually" made for political
reasons: for years the Democratic party has been catering to its black
constituents by crafting majority-black districts, often at the known cost
of creating about two dominantly Republican districts each time it does
so.43 Obviously the purpose here was compound, to create a heavily
black district and to create a heavily Democratic district. Third, even if
Justice Breyer had a magic x-ray machine that could tell him44 that here
the desire to create a substantially African-American district was almost
entirely parasitic on a desire to create a safely Democratic district, it
would still be hard to understand why that makes the latter purpose "pre-
dominant" for constitutional purposes. Throughout our history race-
based decisions have been made on the theory, however benighted, that
they will generate one or more nonracial effects that in other contexts
would be unexceptionable (keeping the peace, weeding out the less qual-
ified, and so on). That hasn't meant they aren't still racial decisions, and
it correctly has not shielded them from invalidation. As Justice Thomas
observed in dissent, "the District Court was assigned the task of deter-
41. See text as note 79-85 infra.
42. Ely, supra note 8, at 612. See also Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial
and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2545 (1997) ("The problem is that this dominant
motive question cannot be answered meaningfully in a redistricting context.").
43. MONMONIER, supra note 4, at 8, 12, 13; Jason Zengerle, Color Line, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
Aug. 6, 2001; Color Lines, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 23, 2001, at 10-11; sources cited Ely, supra
note 8, at 618; David E. Rosenbaum, As Redistricting Unfolds, Power is Used to get More of it,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2001, at 14 ("In 1992, for example, only one Republican was in the Georgia
delegation in the House, Newt Gingrich. Now there are eight white Republicans and three black
Democrats").
44. Pretty clearly contrary to fact, given the need for federal preclearance. See notes 40
supra, 54 infra.
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mining whether, not why, race predominated. 45
The indeterminacy of the predominant purpose test has another
implication as well, that where two or more purposes are in play, espe-
cially where they are as inextricably intertwined as they were here, there
is no principled ground on which an appellate court can hold that a
lower court committed "clear error" in settling on one of them. Indeed
the very fact that the Court's decision was five-four suggests that the
error, if any, was something short of clear, as does the fact that it took
Justice Breyer eleven closely-reasoned and fact-intensive pages46 to
defend the Court's conclusion. He promises us "an extensive review of
the District Court's findings, for clear error, '47 and boy does he deliver,
but "extensive review for clear error" would seem to be something of an
oxymoron. 8
By now it seems obvious, however, that Justice Breyer doesn't
really think "clear error" is the appropriate standard of review in a case
like this. On the surface, though, it is: patently questions of motivation
are factual questions, albeit unusually elusive ones (an observation that
underscores rather than undercuts the conclusion that the trial court is in
a better position to answer them). In defense of the aggressiveness of
his review Breyer mentions that there was no intervening court of
appeals decision, 49 an observation of questionable relevance given that
the law quite sensibly provides that courts of appeals are also, in the
absence of clear error, to defer to the factual findings of trial courts.5"
Moreover, the case was tried before a three-judge district court (one
member of which had been sitting on various versions of it since 1992).
Thus, even limiting ourselves to this particular iteration of the case,
three judges had ruled on it before it got to the Supreme Court, as
opposed to the four who would have been involved had there been a
single district judge and a panel of the court of appeals. It is true that
three is one less than four, but all three of them heard the evidence, and
were thereby in a position to assess its tone and credibility (as opposed
to the single judge involved in the trial of a case that proceeds via the
45. 121 S.Ct. at 1475 (emphasis in original).
46. In the Supreme Court Reporter; it obviously will be considerably more in the United
States Reports.
47. Id. at 1459.
48. 1 suppose it is theoretically possible that it might take eleven or more pages to strip a
lower court's argument to its fulcrum and find it to be defective in a way that is, at the same time,
(a) beyond doubt and (b) too subtle for 44% of the Court to grasp - though I'm bound to say
that's quite a slalom. At all events it doesn't describe this, opinion, which comprises a simple if
articulate marshalling of the arguments on the side other than the one on which the three-judge
court came down.
49. Id. at 1458-59.
50. FED. RULE CIv. PROC. 52(a); Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985).
[Vol. 56:489
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court of appeals). Breyer's point here thus seems upside down: three
factfinders are, if anything, entitled to more deference than one.5 '
In many respects, the factual inferences to be drawn boiled down to
a choice between warring experts. Justice Breyer centrally relied upon,
and thought the lower court should have given more heed to, the state's
expert, Dr. David W. Peterson. However, the trial court had found
Peterson's testimony to be "'unreliable' and not relevant,"5 " and conse-
quently relied more on the testimony of the challengers' expert Dr. Ron-
ald Weber, of whom Breyer obviously has a comparably low opinion.
Anyone who has tried cases involving expert witnesses knows that such
disparate reactions are not unusual, which is hardly surprising in light of
the fact that each side calls its own. The finder of fact has to size them
up and decide whom it trusts more. Of course an appellate court is capa-
ble of reviewing de novo the lower court's opinion of what is and is not
relevant, but which of two witnesses is the more reliable is a determina-
tion the trial court, having heard the testimony, is in a considerably bet-
ter position to make.53 Moreover, the core question here was the
motivation of a group of southern politicians,54 and unlike Justice
Breyer or any of the four other justices who joined his opinion,55 the
three trial judges were (as the system sensibly provides) southerners,
indeed all from North Carolina. 6 The clear error rule seems entirely
appropriate in this case, and should have been followed.
A thorough review of the argument over whether this was or was
not a racially motivated gerrymander would require considerably more
analysis than this, which as I indicated may be one reason for supposing
that neither finding would have constituted clear error. (As one would
expect of good lawyers, the majority below capably marshalled the facts
in support of the conclusion that the legislature's purpose was predomi-
nantly racial, Justice Breyer capably argued that they could be inter-
preted otherwise, and Justice Thomas did a capable job of nitpicking
Breyer's nitpicks.) As I said earlier, however, if the central problem
51. Admittedly my point would be stronger had the lower court not split 2-1. (To his credit,
this split is not something on which Breyer relies; indeed at no point does he quote or even cite the
dissent below). Thus (including the Supreme Court) the judges who heard this iteration of the
case split 6-6, which on the surface suggests (though of course it does not establish) a lack of
"clear error," especially because the vote was 2-1 by those who heard the evidence.
52. 121 S.Ct. at 1463.
53. See, e.g., text at note 27 supra (district court finding Senator Cooper's spin on his earlier
remarks about racial balance "simply not credible").
54. Of course, if one focuses on the motives of the Justice Department, the placation of which
was the North Carolina legislature's most immediate motive, Justice Breyer clearly gets it wrong.
See note 40 supra.
55. The only southerner on the Court authored the dissent.
56. The judge not mentioned in the report of the case - which is to say the judge other than
Boyle and Thornburgh - was Judge Richard L. Voorhees.
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with the Court's opinion were its rejection of the lower court's finding
of a racial gerrymander, I would not have written this comment. For one
thing that inquiry is entirely fact-bound, and like the justices I wasn't
present at the trial and like eight of them 57 I am not (really) a southerner.
Moreover, although I have argued that on balance the Court has been
right in supposing pro-minority racial gerrymanders to be unconstitu-
tional, that question is by no means an easy one. 58 Thus had the Court
said that that was what this was and proceeded to uphold it as such, you
might have heard from others but you would not have heard from me.
However, the way Cromartie in fact was rationalized generates consid-
erably more fundamental concerns.
Reconsider the holding: The court below committed clear error in
finding the creation of a heavily African-American district to have been
the predominant purpose underlying the creation of District 12, in that it
did not convincingly negate the possibility that the legislature may have
gone out of its way to include an unusually high percentage of black
neighborhoods on the theory that an unusually high percentage of blacks
are likely to vote Democratic.
You will be relieved to know that I am through carping about the
questionable application of the clear error standard or the conclusion that
the fact that the intentional inclusion of blacks could possibly have been
effected on the theory that blacks are likely to vote Democratic would
mean that politics, not race, had been the "predominant purpose". There
are bigger fish to fry, namely (1) the assumption that an intention to craft
a safely Democratic district is constitutionally innocent, and (2) the
assumption that using race as a surrogate for probable political prefer-
ence is as well.
II. THE ASSUMED LEGITIMACY OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS
The Court is clear that its holding rests upon the conclusion that
"the creation of a safe Democratic seat" is a "constitutional political
objective".59 The only problem is it isn't.6" In its landmark decision in
57. See note 55 supra.
58. Ely, supra note 8.
59. 121 S.Ct. at 1456-57.
60. The error here unfortunately has roots in Justice Thomas's Opinion of the Court in Hunt
v. Cromartie, the 1999 decision reversing the lower court's grant of summary judgment for the
challengers, and in the process conceding the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering (one of
several aspects of his Hunt opinion that in writing his Cromartie dissent Thomas must have
wished had self-destructed. His [unanimous] Opinion of the Court in Hunt, though reaching the
correct result, overargued at virtually every turn, with embarrassing - and, more importantly,
misleading - rhetorical repercussions for the correct position in Croinartie). In Hunt, Thomas
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Reynolds v. Sims (1964), the Court justified its observation that districts
should be compact and contiguous on the ground that to allow otherwise
would be "an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering, ' 61 and nine
years later, in Gaffney v. Cummings, it again adverted to the constitu-
tional invidiousness of drawing districts so as "to minimize or cancel out
the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting popula-
tion."6 The principal precedent here, however, is Davis v. Bandemer,63
decided in 1986, in which the three-judge district court below had struck
down Indiana's districting plan for its state legislature as a partisan
(Republican) gerrymander. There was no Opinion of the Court,64 its
members splitting four-three-two. In the most straightforward opinion,
Justice Powell, writing for himself and Justice Stevens, 65 strongly (and
in my opinion convincingly) supported the lower court's reasoning and
voted to affirm.
The positions of the other two opinions, each of which supported
reversal, are considerably more contorted, but neither supports the view
that partisan gerrymandering is constitutionally innocent. In an opinion
blending rhetoric that even by 1986 was deservedly obsolete with a per-
ceptive analysis sounding in political safeguards, Justice O'Connor -
for herself and Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist - took the
position that the case presented a "nonjusticiable political question" 66
that the Court should stay away from. On the one hand, she reprised the
warnings of the 1960s, from the likes of Felix Frankfurter and Alexander
Bickel, that electoral disputes were a treacherous thicket the Court
should stay out of.67 By 1986, however, such alarms had generally been
consigned to the dustbin of history: to take only the most relevant com-
parison, the combination of Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims was
cited five opinions purportedly supporting the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering, 526
U.S. at 551, only one of which, Justice O'Connor's three-person opinion in Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S.
952, 968 (1996), actually did.
61. 377 U.S. 533, 578-79 (1964). See also id. at 580-81 (adherence to political subdivision
boundaries calculated to "deter the possibilities of gerrymandering"). As of the decision in
Reynolds, one person/one vote could indeed go some distance toward preventing partisan
gerrymanders, but not any more, given the development of computers. Note 86 infra.
62. 412 U.S. 735, 751 (1973) (emphasis added).
63. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
64. A majority of the justices concurred only in that section of Justice White's opinion
concluding that the case was justiciable. See id. at 113.
65. In light of furor over Bush v. Gore, which furor is certainly justified on a number of
grounds, it seems worth noting that Justices Powell and Stevens were Republicans, the author of
the plurality opinion, Justice White, a Democrat. (And while the entire majority in Bush were
indeed Republicans, two of the four dissenters, Stevens and Souter, were as well. To counter that
their votes prove they are "really Democrats" is transparently circular).
66. 478 U.S. at 144.
67. Chief Justice Burger's concurrence, less than a page in length - he also joined Justice
O'Connor's opinion - is entirely to this effect.
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conventionally counted among the Court's greatest successes, strength-
ening rather than weakening its institutional position.68 (I would add
that such non-interventionist rhetoric renders the votes of O'Connor and
Rehnquist in Bush v. Gore incomprehensible, if it did not seem to render
them all too comprehensible).
Justice O'Connor's other ground for saying the Court should have
stayed out of Bandemer made considerably more sense. Focusing here
on the only genuinely intelligible branch of the political question doc-
trine,69 that the Court need not police those constitutional violations that
the political process can be counted on to control, Justice O'Connor,
drawing on her experience as a state legislator, observed that if the polit-
ical party that is dominant in the legislature tries to grab as many dis-
tricts as it can, it will have to make its projected margins of victory so
thin that it risks losing them all: partisan self-interest will therefore
counsel settling for a limited number of truly safe districts, which neces-
sarily will increase the number of districts that are either competitive or
safe for the other party. 70 But whatever the relative strength of
O'Connor's two grounds, neither of them carries any implication that
partisan gerrymandering is constitutionally innocent: the former argues
simply that the courts should not get into the business of policing such
violations, the latter that they need not (and thus, it seems fair to infer,
they should not).
Justice White's opinion, for himself and Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun, reached a conclusion with identical implications
for the question involved in Cromartie, albeit by a different route. First,
it said unequivocally that allegations of unconstitutional partisan gerry-
mandering are justiciable - indeed this was the only proposition that
garnered a majority in Bandemer7 ' - and obviously there is no point in
holding a claim justiciable if what it alleges is legally innocent. How-
ever, it went on to say that the courts should not invalidate partisan ger-
rymanders unless there has been a showing of "consistent [long-term]
degradation" of the political process. As a holding on the merits this
would have been incomprehensible: violations are violations whether
68. See sources cited JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 120-21 (1980). In an earlier discussion of Justice O'Connor's Bandemer opinion I went
overboard in the silk purse department, essentially pretending that this aspect of it wasn't there.
Ely, supra note 8, at 617-18. (My suggestion that she may have meant to leave open the
possibility that third parties could bring such claims, id., also seems, on rereading, the result of
wishful thinking).
69. See JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM
AND ITS AFTERMATH 55-56 (1993).
70. See, e.g., BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 147-54 (1984); Ely, supra note
8, at 617-18.
71. See supra note 64.
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their effects are long- or short-term.72 It too can thus intelligibly be
rationalized only as rooted in considerations of prudent judicial interven-
tion, something along the lines of "True, partisan gerrymandering is a
constitutional violation, but without proof of serious long-term effect, it
is one that courts should refrain from policing, because given only tran-
sient facts it will resist confident judicial evaluation and thus risk unnec-
essary friction with state legislatures, and deprive those legislatures of
the opportunity - which given the balance of our two-party system is
not unlikely to be realized - to rectify (or at least even out) the situa-
tion over time." How much sense this makes is not relevant to our eval-
uation of Cromartie's obliviousness to precedent: what is relevant is
that there is nothing in Justice White's opinion (or the others) that sug-
gests that partisan gerrymandering is constitutional. Indeed, Justice
White indicated that his test would withhold judicial relief only in de
minimus cases.73 This was a poor and possibly disingenuous prediction,
but it certainly negates any possible inference that he meant to be declar-
ing partisan gerrymandering constitutionally innocent.74
More important than precedent is the sense of the matter. A central
theme of our Constitution is the preclusion of self-dealing maneuvers on
the part of incumbents (other than by the pursuit of constituent prefer-
ences) to perpetuate their incumbency or otherwise promote the fortunes
of their political party.75 As I have argued at length elsewhere, 76 parti-
san gerrymandering is more clearly unconstitutional than pro-minority
racial gerrymandering: whether or not the former should form the basis
of a cause of action, it certainly should not be invocable as a defense to,
or "innocent" explanation of, what appears to be the latter.
III. THE ASSUMED LEGITIMACY OF RACIAL STEREOTYPES
When I was a lad I drafted an opinion for Chief Justice Warren
striking down a congressional statute as a bill of attainder.77 While it
was circulating, Justice Tom Clark (who predictably ended up dissent-
ing) stopped me in the hall to inquire, "A bill of attainder! What on
earth is a bill of attainder?" I responded that he ought to know what a
72. As Justice Powell's dissent demonstrates, Justice White's halting suggestion, that his test
is somehow derived from the Court's decisions respecting racial discrimination, is simply
incorrect. 478 U.S. at 171-72 n.10.
73. Id. at 134.
74. Of course the Cromartie Court could have overruled these prior cases, but it didn't, and
there is not in its opinion a phrase devoted to undercutting the argument that partisan
gerrymanders are unconstitutional, simply an assertion that they aren't.
75. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem,
85 GEO. L.J. 491 (1997); ELY, supra note 68.
76. Ely, supra note 8.
77. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
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bill of attainder was, as he had probably written more opinions than
anyone else rejecting bill of attainder claims. He responded, "True, but
remember what my opinions said: 'It is also argued that this is a bill of
attainder. It is not."' Something like that happened in Cromartie. Jus-
tice Thomas, dissenting, observed that "[i]t is not a defense that the leg-
islature merely may have drawn the district based on the stereotype that
blacks are reliable Democratic voters. ' 78 He did not elaborate further,
conceivably chastened by Justice Breyer's peremptory dismissal (also
without elaboration) of the point: the question "is not, as the dissent
contends . . . whether a legislature may defend its districting decisions
based on a 'stereotype' about African-American voting behavior."79
Except that is the question: Breyer's only hope of rescuing the racial
choices involved in this case must, and does, rely on the possibility that
the districters were relying on the stereotype that blacks vote
Democratic.80
Of course the law ordinarily proceeds by stereotypes - "optome-
trists are better qualified than opticians to replace eyeglass lenses"'" and
so forth. However, and this is central to the past half century's constitu-
tional development, some stereotypes are impermissible, at least where a
reasonably accurate alternative classification is available. The paradigm
example, of course, has been race. Once in a very long while the gov-
ernment can select on the basis of race, when no alternative classifica-
tion can come nearly as close to serving the state interest in question.
(The only examples that spring readily to mind are the selection of
blacks to appear in a police lineup with a black suspect, and the sending
of black undercover officers to a black neighborhood).82 Where, how-
ever, an alternative principle or method of selection will do a decent job,
it must be used:8 3 racial shorthand is forbidden. If you're thinking,
"Yeah, yeah, but here the stereotype is accurate: most blacks do vote
Democratic," think again. A substantial majority of brain surgeons are
white, world class sprinters black, yet we would not countenance for a
nanosecond a racial principle of selection for V.A. hospital operating
78. 121 S.Ct. at 1475.
79. Id. at 1466.
80. See text at notes 33-34, 58-59 supra.
81. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). See generally JOHN HART ELY, ON
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 269-72 (1996); ELY, supra note 68, at 155-56.
82. Or, of course, whites (or whatever) where the suspect or neighborhood in question is
white (or whatever). No, it won't necessarily even out: in many cities minority neighborhoods
are more dangerous. (I am also advised that the separate but equal doctrine is in disfavor).
83. Concerning racially specific affirmative action, it is true that an alternative selection
system could do a much better job of approximating "disadvantage," but obviously not in
achieving racial diversity, which (at least in certain contexts) has many benefits, including the
reduction of race prejudice.
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rooms or the U.S. Olympic team, and instead would require a more indi-
vidualized selection system.84
You will recall that one ground on which Justice Breyer criticized
the testimony of the expert on whom the court below had relied was that
he had noted that the districters often selected for inclusion predomi-
nantly black neighborhoods in preference to neighborhoods of predomi-
nantly Democratic registration: everyone knows, Breyer observed, that
registered Democrats do not always vote Democratic. In other words,
don't use a nonracial stereotype when a racial stereotype will do the job.
This is the exact opposite of what Brown v. Board of Education and its
progeny meant to teach us.
CONCLUSION
I'm optimistic enough to suppose that the Court is unlikely to
export its approval of racial stereotyping outside the voting area.85
However, I don't see how in light of Cromartie it can again, at least for
quite a long time, entertain a complaint of political gerrymandering, a
practice it made a virtual sacrament. And that is serious: given the
capabilities of computers, a green light for partisan gerrymandering can
easily undo the good that the Warren Court thought (correctly in a those
pre-computer days)86 its reapportionment decisions would accomplish.
Give a latter-day Elbridge Gerry or Boss Tweed a modern computer, and
one person/one vote will seem a minor annoyance.87 If the Court was
bent on approving District 12, it would have done considerably less
damage to our constitutional system had it straightforwardly approved
pro-minority racial gerrymandering.
84. Of course we do, and for that matter must, rely on stereotypes all the time, even as we
recognize their imperfection - doctors with certain advanced training, or years of experience, are
likely to be more skillful brain surgeons than others; those who have bettered a certain time in an
NCAA-sanctioned competition within the past year are more likely than others to prevail in the
Olympics next summer - but not racial stereotypes.
85. Of course such a limitation makes no imaginable sense: "to the extent that race is used as
a proxy for political characteristics, a racial stereotype requiring strict scrutiny is in operation."
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 968 (1996) (O'Connor, J.). I suppose we should hope it is imposed
nonetheless.
86. Okay, early computer days. To the extent anyone was thinking about the connection,
computers were somewhat naively regarded as instruments to eliminate, rather than facilitate,
gerrymanders. Curtis C. Harris, Jr., A Scientific Method of Districting, 9 BEHAV. Sci. 219 (1964);
James B. Weaver & Sidney W. Hess, A Procedure for Nonpartisan Districting: Development of
Computer Techniques, 73 YALE L.J. 288 (1963); William Vickrey, On the Prevention of
Gerrymandering, 76 POL. SCe. Q. 105 (1961). See generally MONMONIER, supra note 4, ch. 8.
87. E.g., id. at 30; Samuel Issacharoff, Supreme Court Destabilization of Single-Member
Districts, 26 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 205, 214 (1995).
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FIGURE 1
12TH DISTRICT IN 1997 PLAN
FIGURE 2
12TH DISTRICT IN 1998 PLAN
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